Articles of interest

The Authors

Vladimir Bukovsky is well known as a former political
prisoner in the USSR for twelve years who was released in
1976 in exchange for a Chilean communist leader. He is
the author of eight books, the best known of which are 'To
Build a Castle ' and the last one 'Judgement in Moscow '.

Pavel Stroilov is a third year law student at the Modern
University for Humanities, based in Moscow. He is also a
researcher at the 'Memorial' research centre and has
worked in various Russian archives for three years.

The booklet

Revealed in this publication are things always
suspected by many in the West: the secretive discussions
between Western and Soviet Union leaders planning to
create a collectivist European Union State.

The records of these discussions are so embarrassing
to these various leaders that the archives have now been
closed but not before the authors were able to gain access.

EUSSR

The Soviet roots of European integration

"Our slogan is a world-wide Soviet Union."
Anthem of the Comintern 1938

By

Vladimir Bukovsky and Pavel Stroilov

£4.75

ISBN 0-9540231-1-0

Sovereignty Publications
Worcester Park, Surrey, England

EUSSR

The Soviet roots of European integration

"Our slogan is a world-wide Soviet Union."
Anthem of the Comintern 1938

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By

Vladimir Rukovsky and Pavel Stroilov

Sovereignty Publications

Worcester Park, Surrey, England

Contents

Introduction

Copyright © Vladimir Bukovsky and Pavel Stroilov
All rights reserved

Published December, 2004

By Sovereignty Publications,

28 Highdown, Worcester Park, Surrey, KT4 7HZ

Printed by Donald Martin,
Sudbury, Suffolk, CO 10 2TD

ISBN 0-9540231-1-0

Chapter 1 . Fateful decision
Chapter 2. Crisis of Socialism

Chapter 3. Socialist donkey

- Spanish socialists

- French socialists

- British Labour

- German Social Democrats

17
17
19
21

22

Chapter 4. Other forces from hell

Chapters. Builders at work

Chapter 6. Apres le deluge

25

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Introduction

For anyone even remotely familiar with the Soviet system, its
similarity with the developing structures of the European Union
(EU), with its governing philosophy and "Democratic deficit", its
endemic corruption and bureaucratic ineptitude is striking. For
anyone who lived under the Soviet tyranny or its equivalents
across the world - it is frightening. Once again we observe with
growing horror the emergence of a Leviathan which we had hoped
was dead and buried, a monster which destroyed scores of nations,
impoverished millions and devastated several generations before
finally collapsing. Is it inevitable? Is the human race bent on self-
destruction and doomed to repeat the same mistake time and again
until it dies in misery? Or, is the EU, indeed, simply a clone of the
USSR imposed upon reluctant nations of Europe by the same
political forces which created the first one?

The answer to these questions can be found in the secret
archives of the Politburo in Moscow which the authors were lucky
to get access to. We refer those who want to see the originals to
the archives of the Gorbachev Foundation (Inventories 1-1; 2-2; 2-
3 and 3-1).

Vladimir Bukovsky
Pavel Stroilov

December, 2004

I

1. Fateful decision.

There are some days in history when the destiny of whole
continents is pre-determined for many decades to come. One
would not fmd these dates in an encyclopaedia, neither would
students spend sleepless nights before exams memorising them.
Only the few, the chosen, know and honour those dates.

As for us, the unchosen masses, we go to sleep one night in a
familiar environment of our ancient homeland, and the next
morning we wake up in a desolation of some union of socialist
republics. We are not supposed even to know who has taken that
fatal decision and when.

For Europe, one such date was 26 th March in the year 1987.

That day, the Soviet Politburo made a decision on the USSR's
future policy in Western Europe. Gorbachev formulated the gist of
this policy briefly and clearly, like a battle order:

To strangle in embrace.

This concept already had a specific name among the inner
circle of the Soviet leadership - "Common European Home". Soon
it became known to the whole world.

At that Politburo meeting "Common European Home" was
given the highest priority. Gorbachev strictly prohibited the
making of any political decisions without taking it into account.

Many things, comrades, are involved here. Obviously, we
should not make a decision on any issue without taking Europe
into account. We need it even in our internal affairs, for
perestroika. But in foreign policy Europe is irreplaceable. It means

the strongest bourgeoisie in the world, not only economically, but
politically as well.

Look, it seemed that Japan had outraced the whole world, and
suddenly West Germany made such a dash in the sphere of science
and technology!

Meanwhile, it was exactly in that sphere where Soviet
backwardness had become catastrophic by that time. Indeed,
Gorbachev decided to embrace Europe not because of sincere
brotherly love. He had do choice.

By the beginning of the 1980s, the Soviet leadership had
finally woken up to the fact that their system had entered a period
of profound structural crisis. On the one hand, their economic
model, unproductive and wasteful by definition like all socialist
models, had brought them to the brink of bankruptcy. On the
other, their very 'success' in exporting that model to other
countries was becoming an unbearable burden to carry on their
shoulders. With their troops bogged down in Afghanistan, and
with the Polish crisis looming large on their doorstep, the 'cost of
Empire' had become virtually unsustainable. Simply put, they had
suddenly realised that their economic base was too small for their
global ambitions. Added to that a new round of the arms race
forced on them by Ronald Reagan, falling oil prices and a growing
discontent at home, and one could understand their sudden urge for
reforms. A final blow came with Reagan's obsession with the 'Star
Wars' project. The Americans might have been bluffing, but the
Soviets had to follow suit regardless, trying to compete in the very
sphere where they were most behind the West - high-tech.

The only way to modernize the Soviet economy was to use the
'class enemy's' technological potential.

An important task is to use Western Europe's scientific and

technological potential. All the more so since our Eastern
European friends have already struck there. Our rapprochement
with Western Europe would make their work easier.

Gorbachev's idea was clear enough. On one hand, he feared
the growing economic dependence of the Soviet satellites on the
West. So, he hoped his friendship with Europe would secure the
Western borders of his empire. On the other hand, once the other
communist regimes in Europe were already fraternizing with the
West, he felt it necessary to strengthen their embraces with the
strangling grasp of the Soviet Union. Since these regimes were
dealing with the class enemy anyway, they should do so in
complete unity.

Besides, the Politburo had to take care not only of the Eastern
bloc, but also of the whole world. They came to the conclusion that
'Common European Home' was a key to success of their
worldwide plans.

Europe is present everywhere: in Cambodia, in the Middle
East, in Africa, and, of course, among our Eastern \b\oc\ friends,
and even in Latin America. Without Europe, we are unable
actually to move forward anywhere.

If Western Sovietologists, by some miracle, knew about these
"prospective measures of the USSR's foreign policy at the Western
European direction", they would call it 'finlandisation'. Indeed,
Gorbachev mentioned the Soviet experience of relations with
Finland, and with Austria as well, as a good example of
"constructing new international relations". Now he planned to
expand them to continental scale.

However, Finland and Austria were just small neutral
countries, while NATO kept preventing finlandisation of the whole
of Europe. Hence, the first particular objective followed:

Not to split Western Europe from the USA, but rather to oust
the USA from Europe.

Later, Gorbachev often insisted that the "Common European
Home" project never had been intended to cause a split between
Europe and the USA. He lied.

But, indeed, there is some difference between splitting and
ousting. A split among enemies, good as it is, does not mean the
parties become more hostile to each other than to you. The Soviet
tactic of gradually ousting the USA by strengthening their own
influence is different. This ousting, in turn, created additional
opportunities to increase Soviet influence, whose goal was to oust
the USA ever further. Thus it goes until final victory, when the
Kremlin would be rewarded with an absolutely pro- Soviet,
"finlandised" Europe and with the isolation of the United States on
their own continent.

Shall we succeed? I don't know. But we cannot shirk from
setting this goal. Europe is our problem. Our interests are great
there. And we should not fear.

Gorbachev also emphasised two 'realities' to be seen, analysed
and used. The first one was the 'diversity' of Europe. The Soviets
had to work out the most suitable approaches to every country, to
every political party, to various circles of various societies.

The other 'reality' was European integration. It was necessary
to analyse, Gorbachev said, which aspects of this integration were
good for the Soviets and which were not.

2. Crisis of Socialism.

Before the mid-80s, Soviet leaders and most of the Western
Left were hostile towards the European Communities and the
Common Market, seeing them as a result of a conspiracy between
multinational corporations and liberal politicians.

It was the world-wide crisis of socialism in late 1970s - early
1980s which made them start re-considering this attitude, as well
as many other cornerstones of their strategies.

The Italian Communist Party used to be seen by the Soviets as
disloyal, if not hostile, because of its 'euro communist 1 direction.
Now this had to be re-viewed, too. More than that, Italian
communists played quite an important role in working out the new
strategy. Its General Secretary of the time Alessandro Natta came
to Moscow in January 1986.

A. Natta. [...] Since the late 70s, not only the offensive of
capitalism can be seen in the West, but also certain successes of
this offensive in economic, political and ideological respects (the
ideas of market and competition are getting ever stronger roots) .

The response of the working class, of all the left-wing forces,
to imperialism's attack is inadequate. To be frank, the position of
the communist parties in the West is at a critical stage. It was not
like this 15-20 years ago. There is a retreat, a loss of influence in
the masses, and not only at the polls. The splits and deep crises in
the parties have influenced the working class's position. And the
reasons for this are not only in late reactions to imperialism's
attacks, late evaluation of the new situation, but something else,
too.

And the communists are not alone in this distressful situation,
the Italian continued. Rather, we are facing a common crisis of all
the European Left.

We live in Europe, in Western Europe, We were born there,
and we are fighting for socialism in Western Europe. German
social democrats, British Labourites, French communists have
also met big problems, arising from scientific and technological
progress, collapse of the 'welfare state' and unemployment. The
social democrats have followed their traditional policy, but now
they are beginning to ponder, too. However, the problems we 've
met are not only European. They exist in other parts of the world,
as well.

The latest failure of the European Left had been, at that time,
Mitterrand's attempt (in coalition with the Communists) to build
socialism in France in 1981-1983. This experience became an

object of the most intense attention in all discussions about the
future of socialism.

The French socialists say something we should take into
account. An attempt at democratic reforms in a country like
France is very difficult, unless it is accompanied by similar
attempts in other countries. Just as the socialists began their
reforms in France, the social democrats left the governments in
West Germany and Great Britain. This caused a lot of trouble.
Any progressive reform needs support from other progressive
forces in Europe.

Indeed, by trying to build socialism just in one, 'separately
taken', country one would face a very unpleasant choice. If you
keep building socialism you lose competitiveness. If you take care
of competitiveness, you have no socialism. You cannot combine
these two things, even armed cordons along the borders and other
kinds of iron curtains do not help. The only solution is to impose

8

!

socialism on your competitors as well.

Progressive solutions in the social sphere must fit in the
European framework. In one country, even the most interesting
solutions would give only partial results.

The new attitude of the Left to European integration was pre-
determined by this very consideration. This attitude used to be
cold, if not worse, for many decades, but now they realised that
integration was about the only way to salvation. Many years of
their struggle for power in independent European countries had
proved fruitless. The only thing left to do was to try to seize
control over the whole of Europe at once.

We have to recognise, that the creation of a Single Market is
not just a project, but a reality of Europe's development, Natta
said. That is why the workers' movement of Western Europe,
represented by its political parties and trade unions, should not
ignore this process, but rather get involved in it actively. What
does await us in the future? Decrease of unemployment or
decrease of employment, alleviation or aggravation of economic
problems, increase or decrease of influence of the major financial
and industrial forces? Of course, we would be displeased if
domination by tycoons like Agnelli would emerge in an united
Europe. Let's hope that democracy will prevail, democracy in the
sense of widening the social rights of the citizens, increasing their
political rights, such as a right to truthful information.

Certainly, speaking of democracy, communists always mean
'social democracy', while 'truthful information' in their parlance
has always been an euphemism for communist propaganda. That
is what they hoped would prevail in an united Europe.

However, it was not enough to hope, they had to act. Power
over Europe would not come to the Communists by itself, they had

to fight for it.

who are in favour of social justice, of equality.

"We assume that the European community is a really existing
organisation, i. e. a kind of battlefield on which the leftist forces
have to wage their political struggle", Nafta said.

As for an united Western Europe, so far conservative and
liberal forces still dominate. The leftist forces currently fall
behind. Because, first, they failed to gain the support of a wider
strata of the population. And, second, they failed to get closer to
the centrist forces, representing the interests of new social strata,
employed, for example, in the services sphere or in administration.
These strata are unreservedly in favour of integration.

Of course, this gap is not fatal yet, as we are willing and able
to represent the interests of these new strata. But there is a real
possibility that they will remain under the influence of the centrist
or, at best, social democratic forces. The new social strata exists
and develops independently from our reckonings and forecasts,
and we have to work with them.

Therefore, one thing was clear enough. It was necessary to
unite all the left: communists, social democrats and anyone else
who would support the socialist agenda.

We need new efforts to widen the alliances, not only in Italy,
but also in the European framework. And / mean all the leftist
forces in a wide sense of this word. Not only communist, socialist
and social democratic parties should be involved in these
alliances, but also the whole complex of movements, of progressive
forces with various aspirations, including the religious movements.
In the peace struggle the religious forces outstrip the communists
somewhere, in organisation if not in ideas. For example, in the
Netherlands. In Italy the situation is variable as well: there are
some bishops carrying out reactionary policies and there are some

I

10

J

However, in making these alliances we must preserve the
communist identity of the party. The communist identity is a living
process, not determined once and forever. I should like to repeat
myself: the conditions have become complex, the processes are
developing, and their laws are not established once and forever. I
can see that you are thinking about this as well. Any transition
from one phase of development to another always causes complex
problems. They are not fatal problems, pre-determined once and
forever. These are new opportunities.

However, Gorbachev warned the Italian comrade they should
not go too far. All their manoeuvres, smart as they might be, were
to benefit the main goal: socialism.

One thought, he said. In assessing your work, it is important
always to keep in mind the attraction of the socialist ideal, of the
socialist perspectives. No one except us would think about it.
Others have other ideals, even the social democrats, let alone
conservatives. You are right, we have no prepared position on the
left front, while our task is to enrich the left movement, to get new
allies. Perhaps, some intermediate stages will appear on the way.
We should go through them, not losing sight of our goals. Some
have got lost seeking answers to the questions raised. It is possible
to lose all the positions as a result. [...] We should seek points of
interface, temporary alliances are possible as well. But the true
alternative to the bourgeois parties are the communists.

Of course, this strategy meant inevitable and significant
compromises, but that was acceptable. The Communist dogma
allows that in an extreme situation. All the more so, as this retreat
from Marxist orthodoxy was forced on the Left not only by
political needs, but also, and even to a greater extent, by the
economic crisis of socialism. This crisis urged them to moderate

II

their agenda anyway, introducing some elements of free market
into the socialist model. But they found it to be a good idea to
pretend this was a huge concession not to the reality, but to their
political allies.

We have already mentioned, Natta reminded, that the left-wing
forces have, to some extent, lost their positions in the countries of
Western Europe. One of the causes of this is a certain tardiness in
the analysis and perception of the processes of great changes
under way in contemporary capitalist society. And not only the
communists are late with this, but also the socialists and social
democrats. Absolutely insufficient was our analysis, our critical
approach to the problems of contemporary capitalism, including
the great changes which took place and continue in the sphere of
production, in the social structure of the society. In particular, we
took too defensive a stance on such issues as the
internationalisation of the capitalist economy, development and the
crisis of the 'welfare state ' and so on.

We must recognise that, for example, the 'welfare state'
brought great achievements to the working people - the spheres of
services, pensions, social security. But at the same time we, the
communists, having either overestimated or underestimated the
functions of the 'welfare state', kept defending situations which, as
has became clear only now, we should not have defended. As a
result, a bureaucratic apparatus, which serves itself, has swelled.
It is interesting that a certain similarity with .your situation, which
you call stagnation, can be seen here.

M. S. Gorbachev. 'Parkinson's law ' works everywhere ...

A. Natta. Any bureaucratisatlon encourages the apparatus to
protect its own interests and to forget about the citizens' interests.
I suppose, that is exactly why the Right's demands of re-
privatisation are falling on fertile ground in Western public

12

i

opinion.

Indeed, the decades of 'welfare state' devastated the European
economy no less than a military invasion would do. But its
architects were not honest enough to recognise they had made
basic mistakes in their calculations. They preferred to move to
opposition, gloomily leaving the others to clean out the debris of
this beautiful construction and lament the ensuing "infringements
on the working people's interests". Nevertheless, the picture was
clear even to them. The experiment of the century had failed. Now
they had to retreat, reshuffle the forces and try again. As
Gorbachev said,

let the conservatives take responsibility for the re-organisation
of the economy. The communists ought to bring forward more
topical slogans.

Indeed, it is more important to keep power for a longer time
than to take it quickly. So, the Left decided to step back, uniting
and amassing their forces. They did not have to wait for too long.

In 1992 the creation of the European Single Market is
planned, Natta remembered. This will mean the erosion of all
national frontiers: geographic, fiscal, economic. This will lead to
the creation of a single European currency and ah European
Central Bank. This process will be complex and will inevitably
cause collisions of different opinions. The Left has a chance for
success.

The same reasons which made Western communists re-
consider their policy this way, led their Eastern comrades to the
conclusion about the need for 'perestroika'*. The difference was
that the socialist experiment in the East had gone further, than in
the West. This made the task of healing the economy much more
difficult there. In addition, the Communists in the East had to do

13

this dirty work themselves, as there were no conservatives to pass
the buck to. And, of course, the Soviet 'perestroika' was a failure,
while the Western 'perestroika' was a success. The Western Left
really managed to create this wide alliance, which is still governing
Europe.

However, there are amazing similarities and close
interdependence in the origins, goals and means of both
'perestroikas'. For that alliance of the European Left was
originally supposed to be pro-Soviet. Therefore, it was important
to make the pro-Soviet stance respectable first, and that was what
Gorbachev's reforms were about. As Natta said:

To maintain relations with the Left in Europe is not an easy
task. [...] If the left-wing forces want to be more autonomous,
they must have more connections to the Soviet Union, they must
carry out policy for development and socialism. That is why our
interest in the new stage of your development, which you are
talking about, is so great.

However, to Gorbachev this praise was not something
unexpected, for his 'perestroika' policy was, first of all, addressed
to the Western Left. Judging from these archive documents, it was
international problems rather than internal ones which made the
Soviet leaders start reforms. Not a big surprise, bearing in mind
that the purpose of the Soviet Union's existence was world
revolution. The Soviet people lived in an eternal struggle. Never
did the Soviet power simply take measures - it always delivered
strikes. Even the most peaceful points of the Soviet agenda would
always be formulated as a 'declaration of war' ('fighting
alcoholism', 'battle for harvest', 'war with bureaucracy' etc.).

/*

Therefore, to understand any of the Bolsheviks' activities, we
should, first of all, find out against whom they were directed.

14

First of all, the new image of socialism undermines the
traditional claims of the right-wing circles in the West for
dominating influence, which used to be supported by the image of
the enemy - socialist 'totalitarian monster'. Openly hostile to
socialism the conservative front, which had strengthened in the
West in the early '80s, began to erode, -

said Gorbachev in his secret speech to his Warsaw pact allies
on 6 th July, 1988. It was in that very speech, where he told them
the details of the 'Common European Home' project.

Judging from this speech, 'perestroika' was intended to change
the political situation in Western countries rather than in the
USSR. It was

... to allow socialism to get involved in shaping world politics
more actively and more widely, to influence it more effectively and
to stimulate positive changes in the surrounding world.

In other words, it was to influence foreign politics by any
means, bringing the most "progressive" forces there to power.

Being realists, [we] cannot wait for new partners, for a more
democratic alternative to get into governments in the West. But, in
substance, we are enabling such an alternative.

The renewal of socialism is also an invitation to evolution of
the capitalist world, an encouragement for the forces able to
overcome class prejudice and ready for co-operative work in the
solution of contemporary burning problems to take centre-stage
there. And this can already be seen in the growth of influence of
the bourgeoisie's moderate wing.

In communist ideology, by 'bourgeoisie's moderate wing' they
usually meant socialists and social democrats. The Soviet

15

'pcrestroika' created a favourable political climate for them,
cutting the ground from under the Right. This policy combined
perfectly with the Western Communists' efforts to unite all the Left
in a wide pro-Soviet alliance. That is why Gorbachev, after
listening to Natta's plan, blessed him:

With great interest did we survey your views of the integration
processes, your thoughts and ideas about the alternative to the
existing state of affairs in Western Europe. [...]

What should be the face of the future socialist alternative?
Here we need a lot of analysis and theoretical work. It is clear,
however, that we should not be afraid of alliances in the
framework of the integration processes. You have already outlined
the circle of your search for unity of the Left. I don 't think this will
be easy. The Italian experience shows it is not. All the more so
since it will be on an European scale. But I see that the Left is
quite able to make the integration processes to contribute to
democratisation of Western Europe, to solving the social problems.

What is now going on in Western Europe will pre-determine
the course of events for decades, if not for centuries. The Italian
Communist Party has recognised the importance of a new
approach to this process, in which many forces are involved. But
it is hardly possible to protect the interests of the working people
without the left-wingforces. Therefore we salute [. . .] your efforts.

* Perestroika (re-structuring) is a widely used name for the reforms
introduced by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union (1985 - 1991).

16

3. Socialist donkey.

Needless to say, European socialists have enthusiastically
welcomed the new partnership. This was their dream coming true.
Ever since the social democrats split at the beginning of 20th
century into Bolsheviks (communists) and Mensheviks (socialists),
the latter were hoping that one day the Bolsheviks will see the
light, "mellow down" and return to the fold of Social Democracy.
And the former always shamelessly exploited this dream by
pretending to see the Menshevik's 'light' each time they found
themselves in a tough corner. Hence followed all sorts of Popular
Fronts, United Fronts, etc. which all invariably ended in yet
another quarrel (as soon as the Bolsheviks were comfortably out of
a current trouble). Still, no matter how many times this scenario
has repeated itself, the Menshevik's donkey was always happy to
be once again seduced by the Bolshevik's carrot. What else could
they do? After all, the difference between them was mostly in
questions of tactics, their ultimate goal and, to some extent, their
ideology was and is the same.

So it happened again, with the launching of Gorbachev's
perestroika which was perceived by European socialists as a great
historic opportunity.

Spanish socialists:

...The success of perestroika means only one thing - the
success of the socialist revolution in contemporary conditions.
And that is exactly what the reactionaries don't accept, - said
Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, Spanish Foreign Minister, to
Gorbachev in Moscow, on 3 rd March, 1989. The Soviet leader
appreciated such a deep understanding of his idea, so he replied:

Now, addressing you as a socialist, I ask you to tell F.

17

Gonzalez that all of us should bear in mind one principal point.
Today we, the communists, are working to realise the potentials of
socialism as fully as possible, through perestroika. This is our
model of socialist society. But I am sure that the success of our
search would enrich the socialist values, which are common for all
of us. Alt of us would be able to move forward significantly faster.
I suppose, the Socialist International should be interested in that
no less than ourselves. Eventually, we will manage to sort out
which model of society is best to meet the yearnings of working
people, their hopes for justice. This is something you and we
surely can sort out.

F. Fernandez Ordonez- What you are talking about is
exceptionally important. In the process of perestroika the main bet
is the outcome of the ideological battle. The success of the ideas of
socialism in the contemporary world community depends on the
success of perestroika.

M. S. Gorbachev. Through our perestroika, through the new
ideas brought forward by the socialists of Western Europe, we are
not moving away from each other, we are doing the opposite.
From our point of view, now, at the critical stage of the
development of human history, there are no reasons why the two
factions of the workers' movement should be positioned on
different sides of the barricades once again. No, mutual
understanding and solidarity, adequate to present realities, should
dominate the relations between the two factions of the workers'
movement. We are feeling real comradely interest, sympathy and
understanding of our problems and difficulties, understanding of
the importance of our course by those countries, where socialist or
social democratic governments are in power.

A year and a half later, on 26 th October, 1990, Felipe Gonzalez
himself would tell Gorbachev in Madrid his complex theory of
modern socialism.

lb

The Revolution of 1917, he said, began the split of the world
into two antagonistic systems. The emergence of these two
alternative models actually opened a way to attempts of creating a
third model - social democracy. Nazism, fascism. Today the
essence of the revolution, going on in the world, is the movement to
the united world community.

I must say that confusing ideological and political analyses as
we did for many years - and, to some extent, all of us are
responsible for that - made a fetish of the opposition between
capitalism and socialism. For many years, to a great extent
artificially, we supported that antagonism.

Today I come to one quite strange conclusion. Since we came
to power, I had to struggle with my party comrades to make them
understand that the market economy is the best instrument to
achieve our main goals. Just the best instrument, but not the goal
in itself. I feel intellectual disgust when I have to read, for
example, passages in the documents of 'G7' where the problems of
democracy, freedom of human personality and ideology of market
economy are set on the same level. As a socialist, I cannot accept
such an equation.

French socialists:

The construction of a 'Common European Home' is a great
idea. Anyone who has imagination and intellectual courage,
would easily imagine the European continent, all of the countries
situated there, as a new entity, connected by relations of a new
kind, in the framework of which everyone remains oneself and all
of them co-operate in the name of coinciding goals. I, personally,
consider the realisation of this idea as my top priority.

Thus spoke French President Mitterrand to Gorbachev on 26 th
November, 1988, in Moscow. We can only wonder how he could

19

guess that a 'Common European Home' was something pretty
close to his own pan-European ideas.

Europe, united in the EEC framework is just the first step to
the true goal, to achieve which we will need very much time -
twenty five, fifty years or, perhaps, even the whole century. The
true goal is the whole of Europe.

But some aspects of the bright future, concealed behind the
monumental facade of the 'Common European Home', were
omitted in their public pronouncements. For instance, the common
European structures were supposed to be based not only on the
European Communities, but also on the economic organisation of
the Warsaw Pact — the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
That is why one of Mitterrand's top priorities was the development
of connections between the EC and CMEA.

Since the Soviet Union was the strongest member of the
CMEA, it was supposed to become at least one of the landlords of
the 'Common European Home'. Naturally, this would mean either
socialist 'home', or no 'home' at all.

But Mitterrand was not afraid of that either. He was a
socialist, and nothing socialist was alien to him. For the Soviet
Union was promising to attach something like a 'human face' to its
socialism. If so, why should not the West add a bit of socialism to
its 'human face'?

It seems to me, Mitterrand discoursed, that as far as individual
rights are concerned, the practice existing in Western countries
seems more perfect than the respective practice in the Soviet
Union, At the same time, as far as collective rights are concerned,
especially in industrially developed countries, the West as a whole
will probably have to work a lot in this direction. I mean right to
work and so on.

21)

And other social rights, Gorbachev happily provided the term
from the Soviet jargon.

F. Mitterrand. In France, by the way, there are a lot of areas
where the problem of social rights reflects the inequality between
various strata of French society.

So, Mitterrand clarified his intention to solve this 'problem of
social rights' in France and in Europe as a whole. This probably
meant the elimination of social inequality, of which the 'problem'
was only a reflection. Meanwhile, the East would complete their
'perestroika' and little difference would remain between the two
socialist empires. They would be ready to converge.

British Labour:

On 23 rd August, 1988, Gorbachev's advisor Vadim Zagladin
secretly reported to his boss about his meeting with Ken
Livingstone MP.

The economic difficulties of Western Europe stimulate,
Livingstone said, the process of political delimitation between it
and the USA. The process of political unification of Western
Europe is going to accelerate. I understand, Livingstone
continued, that it is important for the Soviet Union not to allow a
politically united Western Europe to turn into an anti-Soviet bloc.
But this is not necessary at all. Significant political forces in
Western Europe are in favour of other alternatives: Europe's
greater independence in political aspect, which might be either
neutral or developing good-neighbour relations with the East.

Livingstone's general conclusion (and he claimed that this is,
in fact, the opinion of the Labour Party's basic core) is that
nowadays there are very wide opportunities to develop mutually

21

beneficial economic and intensive political contacts between
Western Europe and the Soviet Union. Only one thing is important
- to use these opportunities effectively. In future these
opportunities may change, increase or decrease, but now they are.
perhaps, most beneficial in the whole post-war period. Both you
and we should make the necessary conclusions from this fact,
Livingstone concluded.

German Social Democrats:

Of course, the most enthusiastic supporters of the project were
German social democrats who had established 'special relations'
with Moscow decades before. Even at the high noon of the Cold
War, they cultivated (behind the backs of their partners in various
coalitions) confidential communications with the Kremlin, often
through KGB channels, thus becoming de facto its collective agent
of influence. Here, at last, their hour had come! Their Chairman
1 1. -J. Vogel (together with such a veteran Kremlin collaborator as
Egon Bahr) hurried to Moscow in May 1988.

Perestroika is a help to us all, to the entire progressive
movement in the West. [.,.] [It] removed many obstacles on the
way to cooperation between the forces of the Left, of democratic
forces, and at the same time created new prerequisites for their
further collaboration.

Speaking of his party's prospects, he said that a 'decisive
moment' is coming soon, with the creation in 1992 of the 'single
market ', bearing in mind a necessity for Europe to strengthen its
independence with regards to the USA, Zagladin reported.

However, the main tool for implementing this project was the
Socialist International (SI). Its Chairman Willi Brandt was one of
the first Western politicians to visit Gorbachev after the latter was
elected General Secretary, and different delegations of the SI were

22

constantly on the road to Moscow like Muslims to Mecca. Indeed,
their relations were somewhat similar to those of Islamic
worshippers and their Ayatollah. It came to a point when
Gorbachev was simply instructing them what to do on this or that
issue, and they would report on the implementation next time they
came, seeking his approval like school kids from a teacher.

/ would especially like to emphasize your last thought: it is
extremely important to make perestroika a success. I would be
most grateful to you if you tell us what do you expect from the so-
called West, and from us - social democrats [....J - in terms of
helping perestroika. There is a lot of talk now about the 'end of
socialism ', that it has outlived itself. But I believe that from the
viewpoint of history we are witnessing a new beginning, a new
quality of socialism in a very large part of the world, said Brandt
to Gorbachev in October 1989 when the SI delegation once again
reported for duty.

The scope of their joint activity was, indeed, huge and all-
embracing, from publishing a theoretical magazine and 'trying to
overcome the 1914 split' in the socialist movement to practical
questions of politics. Some errands run by the SI for Gorbachev
were of quite a sensitive nature.

W. Brandt I am concerned with the situation in the Baltic
republics. I am in touch with our Northern friends ...

Exploiting his position in the SI, Brandt was using his
Scandinavian colleagues as proxies in order to put restraining
pressure on the democratic opposition in Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania.

Our influence in that region is not huge. But I would like to
assure you that we will use it only in the interests of pacification. If
need be, we will tell certain people: questioning federation with

23

the USSR is like playing with fire.

4. Other forces from hell.

Indeed, luckily for us all, his influence was not omnipotent,

However, all the talk of opposing US influence in Europe, all

but he was quite happy to play the role of a prison guard and to

the pretence at creating a European 'counterbalance' to the

help his boss in keeping the captive nations from running away.

remaining superpower sounded more like propaganda than a real
goal of the EU. If nothing else, the United States did not oppose it

How is your health, Mr. Gorbachev? Have you got enough

at all, while certain influential forces in America have actively

time to sleep?

encouraged European integration. Thus, on 18 th January, 1989, a
delegation of the Trilateral Commission visited Gorbachev -

Rockefeller, Kissinger, Nakasone and Giscard d'Estaing.
Ostensibly, their purpose was to encourage the Soviets to begin
integrating into the world's economic and financial institutions
(e.g. GATT, IMF), to convert the rouble etc. Then, suddenly,
Giscard took the floor and said:

V. Giscard d'Estaing. Nowadays Western Europe is
experiencing a perestroika, changing its structures. It is difficult
to say exactly when this will happen: five, ten or twenty years later.
But a new modern federal state will emerge in Western Europe.
That is where we are going, and the USSR should be prepared to
communicate with a large single state of Western Europe. This

future state will be open, ready for all forms of co-operation.

•

But then, perhaps, an issue of accession of some other states,
dejure or de facto, will emerge. Most probably, this will include
Austria, Switzerland, Scandinavian countries and, also, some East
European states. We are not going to 'stir up' East European
countries, to shake the basis of their stability. We see the dangers
of destabilisation in different states and we are not interested in
that. But we would like to know, if some East European countries,

while preserving the ties of security with the USSR, wish to become

associate members of the EEC, what would be your attitude to that

idea?

24

25

Kissinger did not object to this either. If nothing else, he was
eager for the USA to become a part of the project:

H. Kissinger. [...] Second line of considerations is related to
the future of Europe, to inter-relations between its different parts.
What do you think of a concept of 'Europe from the Atlantic to the
Urals '? What will be the fate of that part of the Soviet Union
which is situated to the East of Urals? What kind of relations will
there be between the USA and the future Europe?

My colleagues in the Trilateral Commission and I want to
contribute in a constructive manner to the building of this Europe,
in which both the USSR and the USA would have played a
similarly positive role".

Please note that this conversation was taking place in January
1989, when even the Treaty of Maastricht was not drafted yet, let
alone the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice, or the
European Constitution, not to mention the fact that no referenda on
any of them had yet been held. How did they know, much before
we have expressed any consent to these dramatic changes in our
homelands, what will definitely happen in 20 years? Who are
these people? Why do they have such enormous power over our
lives that we all feel irrelevant, our wonted democracy
notwithstanding?

In any case, this quotation leaves us with a host of burning
questions about the mysterious links between the European
superstate project, Giscard d'Estaing and the Trilateral
Commission. What is Giscard's role in the construction of the
European superstate? And what is the connection between this and
his recent authorship of the notorious European Constitution?
Above all, what has the Trilateral Commission to do with all of
that?

26

The mystery continued with Georges Berthoin, the European
co-chairman of the Trilateral commission, who came to prepare
Jacques Delors' visit to Moscow. Here is what Vadim Zagladin,
Gorbachev's advisor on European affairs, reported about this secret
conversation:

On my meeting with the Co-Chairman of the Trilateral
Commission Georges Berthoin.

4'" April, 1990.

The meeting with G. Berthoin took place at his request. During
it, he expressed a number of ideas connected to the forthcoming
visit to Moscow of J. Delors, Chairman of the Commission of the
European Communities, and his intentions.

I. G.Berthoin is an old friend of J, Delors. He began the
conversation, characterising Delors as a dry, very businesslike
person, but, deep in his soul, sincere and loyal to his beliefs. He is
able to change his beliefs, but only under the influence of
conclusive arguments.

Then my companion noticed that Delors is coming to Moscow
this time first of all as the Chairman of the Commission of the
European Communities. Meanwhile, we should take into account
that nowadays he is the only West European politician, who has
certain authority and 'means something' for each of the twelve
member-states of the Community.

For example, as for his own country - France - he is one of
the possible candidates to become its President. [...]

For Germans, Berthoin continued, Delors is the only West
European politician who enjoys practically unreserved trust. In
Germany, he has relations with all the political circles, and all of
them take him into account to this or that extent.

27

For Englishmen, Delors is the man who has persuaded the
trade unions to support the idea of the Common Market.
Naturally, Margaret Thatcher likes Delors little just for this
reason. But she takes him into account, too.

Delors is also respected in Spain, Portugal and Greece,
because it was he who, during the negotiations on these countries'
entrance into the Common Market, pressed for a longer
transitional period for them and for more beneficial conditions of
entry.

In other words, concluded G. Berthoin, Delors is the man who
is able to influence other countries' positions and many things in
the future position of the European Communities depend on him.

2. Nowadays, Berthoin said, Delors is most concerned with the
following problems: the German question (he is for the unification
of the two German states, but he intends to find a solution which
would neither damage the European Communities, nor the
European idea); the increase of political power of the European
Communities, i.e., in fact, their transformation into a kind of
federation; the problems of co-operation between the Communities
and Eastern Europe. Naturally, he will probably wish to know the
opinion of the Soviet leadership on all these issues.

He is going to be particularly interested, my companion
continued, in the following aspects of the above problems.

Delors wants to understand our goals concerning Eastern
Europe. To be more precise, he is interested what, in our view,
our own relations with the countries of Eastern Europe should be
and what the West's relations with these countries should be; what
we consider to be important, from the point of view of the
provision of our own security in a military and a political sense,
and economic security of our country as well.

In connection with this, Delors will probably be interested in
what we think of [President Mitterrand's] idea of European
confederation. Talking to Berthoin himself, as my companion told
me, Delors meditated: is, for the Soviet Union, the idea of
'European confederation' identical to the idea of 'Common
European Home? Then he asked a question, whether the Soviet
Union considers itself as a whole, from Brest to Vladivostok,
belonging to Europe. Or the USSR counts on its Western part's
only 'involvement in Europe'. In Delors's opinion, it is difficult to
imagine that the whole Soviet Union, including, for example, its
Asian republics, can become a member of the Common European
Home. He would like to hear the Soviet argument about that.

In fact, Berthoin went on, the further evolution of Delors's own
concepts much depends on what these arguments will be. The idea
of categorical separation of the whole Soviet Union from Europe is
alien to him. He understands that the USSR is a single entity.
However, at the same time, if the whole USSR will be a part of the
Common European Home, what should we do about the USA ?

During his talks with Berthoin, Delors used to ask him a
question like that, as well: would it be clever to integrate Japan?
Certainly, Japan is not Europe. But, in fact, Europe, USA and
Japan is a single complex, to some extent. Is it possible that the
European process can, after some time, become a factor,
contributing to constructive co-operation of all the countries of the
Northern hemisphere?

G. Berthoin added, that in his persona! opinion, Delors lacks
clarity in all these questions. All his ideas bear elements of
realism. But, on the other hand, if we try to base today's policy on
the idea of the whole northern hemisphere's co-operation, would it
not lead to the destruction of the European idea as such?

However, in Berthoin's opinion, short-term and long-term

29

strategies of the European Communities will, in many respects,
depend on the results of negotiations between Delors and
Gorbachev.

3. Berthoin expressed interesting ideas , concerning Delors's
views on the general problems of contemporary international
relations. In the opinion of the Commission of the European
Communities' Chairman, there is currently a kind of struggle being
carried on in the world between two kinds of diplomacy. One of
them is the traditional diplomacy of defending the national
interests of every country, separately. The other kind is diplomacy
based on the growing interdependence of nations, which
(interdependence) means the necessity of integration both in the
economy and in politics.

Probably now, (reasons Delors, according to Berthoin), we
can see a kind of compromise between these two approaches. This
compromise has a strong influence upon the positions of separate
countries and the EEC as a whole about the choice of the way
forward, working out the so-called architecture of the future
European and world order.

In Delors's opinion (though, in principle, he supports F.
Mitterrand's policies and, in turn, enjoys his support), the French
president has not made a conclusive choice yet between the old
and the new kinds of diplomacy. That is why he is so inconsistent
on many issues, including the one of France's role in the world and
in Europe, and the German question.

Delors himself believes, that today's compromise approach
(which, in his opinion, can be seen everywhere) cannot exist for a
long time. Either Europe and the world return to the old
approach, which would be very dangerous, reviving the old
international conflicts, or the new approach wins, oriented
towards a wide integration, and then the world would really get a

30

Li

new quality.

I don't know, Berthoin said, whether Delors will ask this
question directly to Gorbachev or not. Anyway, he will bear it in
mind.

[■•■]

In the end Berthoin said, that he had decided to tell me so
frankly about Delors's plans not only by the right of an old friend,
but, first of all, because he wants Delors's visit to Moscow to be
marked by really serious advances in solving the burning
European and world problems. "This is what our common future
depends on", he concluded.

Admittedly, we know too little about this secretive Trilateral
Commission to draw any far-reaching conclusions, but one thing
we can claim for certain: it was unlikely to encourage an anti-
American project. Somehow, their ultimate goals must have
coincided with those of the European integrationists. Could it be
an idea of World Government somewhere in the misty future, for
which the EU was perceived by them as a step in the right
direction? Such interpretation, often rejected and ridiculed as a
'conspiracy theory', has nonetheless some documentary evidence
to support it. Speaking with Argentinean President Carlos Menem
on 25 th October, 1990, Gorbachev mused:

M.Gorbachev. [...] But we should go further. Further
progress will depend on the actions in Europe, in Latin America,
in the Asian-Pacific region. After the European home is built,
many other homes of cooperation must follow. [..J

C. Menem. [...] speaking of integration, everyone agrees with
it. We in Latin America intend to act along the same lines as
Europe. In general, humanity has no other choice. And then, after

31

integration, we will concentrate on conquering the universe,

M.Gorbachev. One of my aides has written sometime ago that
we need to create a world government. People were laughing at
him at that time. But now?

C.Menem. Some 40 years ago Per on was speaking of
continentalism which would enable us to go for a world
government.

M.Gorbachev. I believe we should think about enhancing the
UN role. It could not realise its potential for 40 years and only
now did it get such an opportunity. Here is a proto-type of the
world government for you.

However, traditional anti- American orientation of many forces
in Europe was routinely exploited in order to get them aboard.
Thus, reporting on his talks with the former French Ambassador to
the USSR, Henry Froman-Meris, Zagladin notes that his collocator
tried to dispel Soviet fears of European military integration as a
potential for a new arms race by playing the anti-American card:

My companion assured me that nobody in the West is thinking
about a military build-up, rather the opposite. And then, lowering
his voice to half-whisper for some reason, he said: "You see, it wilt
not be an American union, it will be an European one, and not in
the NATO framework". To my objection that most of the EEC
members take part in NATO military organisation, my companion
winced and replied: "anyway, Europe wants to have its own
defence policy, and we are going to discuss the issues, connected
to it, with you".

And offered in conclusion his advice:

that we 'don 't over-sell ' the idea of a Common European
Home, don 't 'scare the Europeans away '.

32

5. Builders at work.

So, the pro-Soviet alliance grew even wider than its initiators
had ever hoped. Not only the Left, virtually the whole world
idolised Gorbachev. Any of his ideas, including the 'Common
European Home' were enthusiastically accepted, though most of
his followers hardly understood his goals.

Thus, Jacques Chirac, then Mayor of Paris, was terribly
puzzled by the idea of a 'Common European Home' (which did
not prevent him from fully supporting the project). Being
somewhat naive, he made a wrong conclusion after listening to
Gorbachev for a while that the 'Common European Home' would
consist of two different parts: socialist East and capitalist West.

If we understand you correctly, the Common European Home
you have mentioned will consist of two separate constructions
under one roof. As far as we are concerned, we would like to
create a more uniform building, with greater intertwining of its
parts, based on peace reinforced by the disarmament policy, on
growing exchanges, on ever more uniform understanding of human
rights, he told Gorbachev in 1989.

M. S. Gorbachev. I think you understand our approach
imprecisely. Perhaps, you don't have full information on what we
actually mean.

Judge for yourself, what may happen if you tell us: transform
to what we wish you to be, while we shall wait and see. We, in
turn, would address the same request to you. Naturally, nothing
good would come out of that. We need different approaches.

There are certain realities: we have two systems, two military
and political blocs, two sets of values innate to each of us. Now,

33

let's try to move the whole process forward on the basis of these
realities. And, along with political contacts, let us set connections
between military and political blocs, economic communities,
cultural centres, capital cities etc. All of this, as we believe, would
create a new situation, when the trappings of the Cold War and its
alienation would be eliminated step by step.

In a word, there is a positive potential. It is like one family.
There might be differences between its members, which does not
prevent them from normal coexistence, from bearing responsibility
for themselves and for the family. We should proceed from the
existing realities rather than from ideological postulates and
sympathies. As a result of communication, the exchange of ideas,
the whole situation may become different. New opportunities may
emerge, which we don't even suspect now, but with which we will
have to deal in the future.

Probably, the most difficult question after we build the
Common European Home would be that of where the main capital
city should be situated...

At this point Gorbachev realised he had already told too much.
So, he chuckled and said:

...But, probably, all the capitals should remain as they are.

And Chirac, happy as a lark, went away to work on that
construction site. There he spent the next fifteen years, even after
the chief architect of the project had to change his profession to
that of a pizza seller.

Socialists were more in tune with the fundamentals and less
naive,

We believe the builders' team for this home must be European-

34

wide, Gorbachev was telling the visiting leader of the German
social democrats H.-J. Vogel. There are certain realities here,
such as NATO and the Warsaw pact.

H.-J. Vogel. Every house must have load bearing walls. Those
organizations fit the requirement. [...]

The other two 'walls' of the building, as both of them happily
agreed, were supposed to be the CMEA and the EEC.

It is important to make sure that integrational processes in
both parts of Europe did not diverge.

[...] / would also like to know your attitude to the current
stage of the development towards a new order in Europe, bearing
in mind the interests of stability and peace. This corresponds to
your ideas of a Common European Home. For we have already
built the first floor of that home - West European integration,
asked French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas when visiting
Moscow in November 1989, eager to be assured that the blueprints
are still the same.

Gorbachev. This is only an annexe to it.

R. Dumas. Yes, we can call it an annexe. But, building the
next floors, we should have a common architectural design and try
to have our floors compatible.

Dumas had every reason to be worried because the Eastern
half of their common home was suddenly showing cracks all over
its edifice, its rafters were threatening to fall down on the heads of
the ill-fated builders. The Berlin Wall had just crumbled down to
earth, exposing the weakness of the whole construction.
Gorbachev urgently needed a prop-up from the Western side.

35

It is agreed, that the changes are gathering speed in the
countries of Eastern Europe. Bui is the West changing? - he
demanded.

R. Dumas. This is a good question [...]

M. S. Gorbachev. By the way, my conversation with you is
lightened by the fact that we represent two tendencies of the
socialist, workers' movement. Did you not forget about that?

R. Dumas. If you see signs of surprise in my eyes, this is only
because I was just going to say the same thing.

But, worries aside, they continued to dream on regardless. On
19 th July, 1990, Delors, properly introduced by Berthoin to
Zagladin, came to Moscow. And here is what he told Gorbachev
about his architectural views:

I see three floors in the architecture of Europe. The first floor
is Europe of 'the twelve '. And to those who are afraid of a united
Germany and the dominance of the German Mark, I say: as
Germany is among 'the twelve', it will be the ECU, not the
German Mark, which dominates. The second floor is Europe as a
whole, including the Soviet Union. Here, undoubtedly, the
problems of disarmament and measures of trust are important, but
we also should think about the coming CSCE [Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe] meeting on measures in the
areas of ecology, transport and energy. When the time comes and
European countries' economies get close enough to each other, we
can turn to what Mitterrand is talking about, to European
confederation. And the third floor is the CSCE, including the USA
and Canada. We involve them in the collective resolution of great
problems. But Europe is growing, expanding and getting ever
greater autonomy.

At this stage any more sober-minded bricklayer than our

36

dream-builders from cloud cuckoo land would have been running
for cover, as the collapse was much in progress. Czechoslovakia
had just opted out of a socialist future, Poland had already elected
its first post-communist government, the Baltic states were pushing
for complete independence and in the German elections the social
democrats were utterly defeated. The future was bleak for
Gorbachev and his Western partners could offer him little help in
practical terms.

On 3 rd April [\99ty I met Jacques Atiali, special advisor of the
French president [...] reported Zagladin.

Finally, J. Attali told me that currently a plan to establish a
new body is being thought over in the European Communities. A
Senate of Europe is expected to be created soon, alongside the
European Parliament. In the Senate separate regions, rather than
countries, will be represented. For example, senators from France
will be representatives of Alsace and Lorraine, Brittany,
Normandy etc. From Spain there will be representatives of
Catalonia, Country of Basques, Andalusia etc. Thus, not only
ambitions of countries, but also those of separate regions will be
satisfied.

Perhaps, J. Attali asked rhetorically, if in future the USSR is
represented in the European Parliament, its separate regions, such
as Lithuania, may be represented in the Senate of Europe? I asked
whether Attali admitted the USSR might enter the European
Community, which is necessary to be represented in the European
Parliament. Attali replied: "this is, of course, the question of the
future and of the further development of the USSR. But,
personally, as a theorist of politics rather than a practitioner, I
accept this is possible".

Alas, it was too little too late. The Soviet empire had, in
essence, already collapsed, and there were no forces in the world

37

able to save, or rather resurrect it. But the socialists kept trying
until the very end. The donkey was simply unable to face the fact
that the carrot it had followed for almost a century was lost
forever. And at what a moment! At the very eve of an historic
victory, when the Left had finally managed to hijack the European
project, and were already preparing to "build the new international
order on worldwide scale". They were beginning to believe in
their invincibility.

So, they kept trying.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union International
Department wrote in a secret report, dated June 7" 1 , 1991.

[...] the process of reforms in the countries of Eastern and
Central Europe is marked by the dismantling of socialism, by
elements of 'wild capitalism ' being developed and by the level of
the working people's social security falling down. This causes
concern among the leading European parties - members of the
Socialist International. They are conducting a search for means to
oppose these unwanted trends in social development. [...]

Apparently, French socialists were the most vociferous.
According to the report, they were worried by the problem of the
survival of the socialist idea in the conditions of its crisis in
Eastern Europe.

However, most of the 'means' the socialists suggested were
various forms of chat: meetings, conferences and informal talks on
such burning issues as: "problems of relations between socialists
and communists", "new concept of the socialist and social
democratic parties' actions in the conditions of a changing
Europe" or "The European Community and Eastern Europe after
the unification of Germany: challenge to the Left".

>X

The communists tried to make even these impotent activities
helpful by drawing the attention of international political circles
and the public to the unconstructive position of Hungary, Poland
and Czechoslovakia (whom, perhaps, Bulgaria will join soon) on
the problem of these countries' new treaties with the Soviet Union.

The Warsaw Pact was dead, and the Soviets were desperately
trying to substitute it with a series of hilateral treaties while the
former 'brothers' were striving to wriggle out of them by hook and
by crook. Who else could help at this dark hour but the old loyal
Menshevik donkey! And he did oblige by putting pressure on the
emerging East European democracies not to escape from the
Soviet concentration camp.

At the last moment, just a few months before the Soviet
collapse, no lesser figure than Pierre Mauroy (former French
Prime-Minister and Vice Chairman of the SI) offered to come to
Moscow and to work out a salvation strategy. And he did, too! On
September 17 th , 1991, a SI delegation headed by him was speaking
with Gorbachev.

P. Mauroy. A really tough question - about the future of
socialism in your country. [...] You said yourself that the old
communist model has disappeared. Of course, socialism in your
country will be of a Soviet type, the one which suits your country.
However, I am convinced that your democratic society will fit into
the framework of the socialist movement developing in Europe,
and in the rest of the world. [...] The fact that we are here,
standing beside you after the two movements of the workers were
separated for 73 years makes me all emotional. We hope that
socialism, freedom, democracy will be a common destiny of your
country and ours, within the framework of diversity we see today.

Our donkey had finally got his carrot.

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Within three months the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
was no more. Half of the European building was lying in ruins.

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6. Ap res le deluge.

One would expect our builders of the brave new world to
become disheartened by such a catastrophe. At the very least, they
should have re-assessed their project, investigated the causes of
this disaster, made some corrections in the design. Or, perhaps,
even abandon it altogether: after all, a need to overcome the great
European divide thus saving the world from the nuclear holocaust
was always cited by them as a main justification of the project.
And here we were, looking at the ruins of the Soviet empire which
was the only threat to peace in Europe for half a century. No need
for any effort or strategy, any complex construction or
sophisticated diplomacy. The divide closed on its own. We could
have lived happily ever after.

At least there was definitely no need to continue building
structures so similar to the Soviet ones. Yet, this is what our
builders did, as if nothing happened, From the Maastricht Treaty,
to the Amsterdam Treaty, to the Treaty of Nice and finally to the
draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the 'democratic
deficit' grew, the layers of bureaucracy multiplied, the lies and
coercion became endemic and we, the people of this ancient
continent, became more and more irrelevant. Gone is the initial
pretence that our nations' sovereignty is not at stake; today we are
openly told about a single state of Europe as a goal of the project.
Why did not they say it before, if they knew it 20 years ago? Was
it in order 'not to scare Europeans away'?

Still, the ultimate truth about it is not revealed yet and is
unlikely to be ever admitted by them, namely, that the whole
project is nothing but a clever attempt by a bankrupt socialist
nomenklatura to salvage their bankrupt Utopian dream and their
unearned position of power.

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When they ask us to vote for their numerous treaties, why
don't they simply say: Vote for Socialism!

When they force impoverished nations of Eastern Europe to
join their shining city on the hill by false promises of prosperity,
why don't they say in plain language: Here is a chance for you to
live under socialism again!

When they offer us this monstrous grossbuch (big book) of a
Constitution, as unintelligible and as lengthy as Karl Marx's Das
Kapital, why don't they just say: Here is a roadmap to the
European Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. Vote for it!

But they don't because they know very well that no nation on
earth will ever vote voluntarily for this bankrupt idea. Instead,
they use every deception possible to conceal the true nature of the
beast.

For those of us, however, who have already lived in the belly
of that beast, the truth is self-evident. We can even predict what
will happen with a good degree of accuracy. In fact, this is not a
terribly difficult trick to perform as long as you remember one
basic rule: Utopians always deliver exactly the opposite to what
they promise.

They are telling us now that one of the reasons we need such
an European superstate is to avoid war in Europe. At this
particular point there is no threat of war here, not at least of any
serious war, but at the end of their experiment the countries of
Europe will be so much at odds with each other that they will be on
the verge of conflict.

We are told that it is necessary for us to suppress our ethnicity,
our nationality, our prejudices, our traditions and then we would be
living as multi-national communities happily ever after. We can

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tell you in advance, the opposite is going to happen. After seventy
three years of living in the Soviet Union which was supposed to be
a happy family of nations we had so much ethnic conflicts that no
other country could produce. Look at former Yugoslavia which
also claimed to be one happy family of nations under socialism.

We are told today that the aim of the EU is to become
prosperous. Our economy will be capable of competing with the
United States thus enabling Europe to stand up for its interests.
The opposite will happen. Over-regulated, over-bureaucratic, the
over-taxed economy of the European Union will become very
weak, the nations of Europe will become poorer and poorer and
more and more dependent on the United States.

They are telling us that the peoples of the EU will enjoy
unprecedented freedom and human rights. They are lying for they
began by depriving us of the most basic right - a right to elect by
direct ballot those who govern us. We do not elect those People's
Commissars who govern the EU. And this is just the beginning.
What about that sinister Europol, or Eurojust with its 'European
arrest warrant', its diplomatic immunity and the power to prosecute
the ill-defined 'crimes' of 'racism' and 'xenophobia'? One
wonders how many former East German Stasi officers, or their
colleagues from other East European countries will end up
working there. Judging by the example of the latest Commission,
which has seven former communist apparatchiks out of 25
Commissioners, we might have up to one- third of them. If we
learned anything from the lessons of the last century, it must be the
notion that every Utopia ends up in a GULAG of its own. And it
just remains to be seen what kind of a GULAG will the EU create.

Meanwhile, the EU will continue to expand uncontrollably,
unable to stop, until it collapses in exhaustion pretty much like the
late Soviet Union. In his parting speech, Romano Prodi had
already drawn us a map of that expansion by including in the

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sphere of EU interests the whole of the Middle East, North Africa
and Turkey. And if they achieve complete integration of the whole
globe, they will begin conquering the universe, as we remember.
No Utopian dreamer can ever stop dreaming of expansion because
no Utopia has ever worked in a limited space, be it a village, a
town, a continent or a planet. But, once it stops expanding, it
invariably collapses.

Yes, it will collapse very much like its prototype did. But in
doing so it will bury us all under the rubble. And it might take a
generation to clear up the mess. Do we really need to go through

this?

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